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LIBERALISM' S AMBIVALENCE
Anne C. Dailey*
In Liberalism in Love, Nomi Stolzenberg paints a compelling
portrait of the enduring tension between rationalist and romantic
versions of liberalism.' Her essay is a thoroughly engaging and brilliant
uncovering of this conflict at the heart of twenty-first century
liberalism. 2 As she describes it, rationalist liberalism views the world
and the individual psyche as properly governed by reason.3 In contrast,
romantic liberalism considers at least some spheres of human activity
and certain arenas of the psyche as properly ruled by the passions.4 We
are accustomed to thinking about law as a rationalist liberal enterprise
committed to the ideals of individual autonomy and reasoned
deliberation. Stolzenberg's essay exposes the surprising extent to which
romantic ideas about human experience and the self have penetrated
American legal discourse over the past century.5 Her project explores
the implications of this romantic encounter with the rationalist liberal
enterprise.
6
Although weakened, rationalist liberalism still maintains a steady
hold on our conception of the public sphere. Where romanticism has
staked its dominance is in the realms of intimate relationships and
spirituality. It is in these spheres of human experience that we see the
flowering of romantic ideas about individual freedom, self-expression,
free love, spiritual transcendence, and the whole structure of ideas
surrounding privacy and autonomy in modem liberal legal thought. We
might extrapolate from Stolzenberg's thesis that the First Amendment
and the Due Process Clause are two important constitutional pillars of
this distinctly romantic conception of the self and intimate activity.7
* Evangeline Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Liberalism in Love, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 593 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 593-94.
4. Id.





The 1943 decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette8 was the Supreme Court's first bold stance against "orthodoxy"
in matters of religion.9  The decision in Griswold v Connecticutl°
played the same role with respect to the protection for family life and
marriage." Romanticism arguably reached its apex in Lawrence v.
Texas,12 where the Court overturned precedent to recognize free love as
a protected site of individual liberty. 13 In all these areas, as Stolzenberg
tells us, liberalism in love means a state of radical legal deregulation. 
14
Liberalism in a state of love not only demarcates certain spheres of
romantic experience, but it also presents us with an alternative
conception of the self. Rational liberalism provides us with an ideal of
the autonomous, rational, choosing actor, Stolzenberg explains, whereas
romanticism offers a competing conception of the ideal self as liberated
from the constraints of reason. Stolzenberg's argument here leads me to
wonder whether the rise of romantic liberalism was reflected in, and
perhaps even fueled by, the spread of psychoanalytic ideas in the early
twentieth century. Sigmund Freud's Libido Theory fits perfectly with a
penchant for free love-if we can remove the repressive factors
inhibiting sexual desire, then we will resolve neurotic symptoms and
increase the individual's direct and unconflicted experience of the
passions. 15 To the extent rationalism has yielded to romantic
psychology, what results is an essentially psychoanalytic vision of
human freedom as throwing off the repressive constraints of reason, an
opening up to the creativity, spontaneity, and transformative potential of
the state of love. As Stolzenberg tells it, romantic liberalism promises us
"freedom in matters of the heart" as we have come to understand it
psychologically over the past century and a half. 
16
8. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9. Id. at 642 ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion . .
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. Id. at 484-86.
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. Id. at 578 ("The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.").
14. Stolzenberg, supra note 1, at 609.
15. Sigmund Freud, The Libido Theory (1922), reprinted in 18 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREuD 255 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1955).
16. Stolzenberg, supra note 1, at 610.
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So we may conclude that in certain spheres of experience-
familial, sexual, and spiritual-we are all Romantics now.
Well, not quite all of us.
Romanticism has met with considerable resistance, both in
psychology and law, and it is Stolzenberg's task to document this
enduring conflict. In psychology, the cognitive/behavioral revolution
has brought about a dramatic decline in the prominence of
psychoanalytic research and therapy. 17  Moreover, the work of these
cognitive psychologists now exerts a powerful influence on legal
scholarship as well. Behavioral legal studies promotes a vision of
individual rationality in almost every area of social life, including
marriage. 18 Rationalism maintains a strong hold on constitutional law as
well. Many decisions protecting free expression and individual
autonomy actually emphasize decisional freedom, the right of the
individual to choose how to live his or her life.' 9 Decision-making
autonomy is closely associated with many rights in a liberal state,
including the rights to vote, to freedom of speech, and to personal liberty
in matters relating to marriage, reproduction, and childrearing. Children
are denied constitutional rights-even in the sphere of the family--on
the ground that they are not "fully rational, choosing agent[s]. '' 20 The
strong imprint of rationalism still exists even at the heart of modem legal
notions of the self and personal freedom.
This enduring conflict between rationalism and romanticism is a
struggle over the soul of liberalism, as Stolzenberg puts it. 21 All I can
add to her fascinating exposition of this struggle is a slightly different
perspective on what it means. I want to suggest here that the
relationship between rationalism and romanticism is not necessarily a
conflict between two opposing views of human experience and selfhood.
It is, at bottom, an ambivalence. In other words, the
cognitive/behavioral assault on romanticism should not necessarily be
quickly diagnosed as a defensive maneuver, a rationalist attempt to ward
off romanticism and to repress the romantic psyche and its passions.
Instead, the continuing viability of rationalist ideas about the self may
17. See Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 175 (2010).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) ("After Griswold it was
established that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond
the marital relationship.").
20. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988).
21. Stolzenberg, supra note 1.
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reflect a deep and inescapable psychological truth: an ambivalence
which actually allows romantic experience to emerge and flourish.
In what follows, I elaborate what it means to think about the
relationship between rationalism and romanticism as a necessary
ambivalence rather than a confrontation between two worldviews.
The freedom, excitement, and growth that can accompany throwing
off the constraints of reason are enticing, seductive even. Again, we are
all at least aspiring romantics. But we must not overlook the dangers of
a sphere of personal experience without the constraints of reason, where
repression is lifted and anything goes, where free love is the paradigm of
human liberty. I am not necessarily referring to the costs to human
relationships when we elevate flirtation over commitment, as Adam
Phillips would advocate. 22 I am not warning about a world without
loyalty and duty and reliability, all values arguably sacrificed by
romantic flights of passion. It is not just that romanticism has its costs,
but that it actually offers a much darker portrait of the pleasures of the
state of free love itself. The state of love may not always be the
liberating, freedom-enhancing, or gratifying experience we assume it to
be. This is its idealized version, its "romanticized" version. Again, it is
not just because free love sacrifices the value of commitment or that
changes of heart can injure as well as rejuvenate. Rather, this darker
portrait yields two more fundamental concerns.
First, the romantic psyche is one that flirts with, and sometimes
succumbs to, aggressive, hateful, self-destructive feelings. These
aggressive impulses or drives define one of the core dangers of
romanticism, the possibility of domination, of sexual conquest, of
submission to a more powerful figure, of self-annihilation. Early in his
thinking, Freud identified the existence of sadistic feelings in young
children struggling to master their oedipal frustrations and fears.23
Freud revised his pleasure-seeking theory of the libidinal drives in the
aftermath of World War I, when he came to realize that something more
was operating in the realm of the unconscious than just the drive for
sexual gratification.24 He called this aggressive impulse the "death
22. ADAM PHILLIPS, ON FLIRTATION (1994).
23. See Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality (1905), reprinted in 7 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 125
(James Strachey ed. & trans., 1953).
24. See Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), reprinted in 18 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra
note 15, at 1.
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instinct ' 25 and, although later analysts have conceptualized aggression in
different ways,26 the existence of intense aggressive and sadistic feelings
has been a central thread in psychoanalytic thinking from the beginning.
Analysts believe that, through the exercise of reason, an individual can
get some measure of control over these dark and potentially self-
destructive aspects of the psyche.27 Despite all its grappling with the
realm of unconscious desires and instinctual drives, then, psychoanalysis
is a discipline founded on the traditional rationalist principle that it is
through the exercise of reason, of interpretive understanding, that an
individual can understand and master the darker elements of the mind.28
We have to be wary that romantic liberalism offers only the false
hope of instinctual gratification, a "transference cure," as the
psychoanalysts call it. 29  A cure, in other words, that satisfies our
longings for love, our idealized notions of the power of love to rescue us
from our darker feelings, our hope that the incestuous love of the analyst
will finally bring us the peace and happiness we are seeking. We long
for this without realizing that this cure through love might leave
untouched the aggressive, rageful, and narcissistic feelings still operating
below the surface of awareness. Falling in love brings real danger, as
advocates against domestic violence know well, but it brings
psychological danger as well. Rationalism and its regulatory regime can
thus serve to protect us against the dangers posed by the unleashing of
romantic passions, by what Stolzenberg calls the state of being in love.3 °
Rationalism may be necessary to the romantic psyche in a second,
more fundamental way as well. The romantic poets clearly understood
the reality of psychological fragility, that too great an entry into the
world of the passions cannot only expose aggression, but can
fundamentally destabilize the psyche. 31 They knew well that romantic
creativity can border on madness; they lived it themselves. When we
celebrate free love, we may be celebrating the passionate intensity that
comes with a certain loss of boundaries and selfhood, that glorious
25. Id. at 54.
26. See, e.g., MELANIE KLEIN, THE SELECTED MELANIE KLEIN (Juliet Mitchell ed.,
1987).
27. See Freud, supra note 24.
28. See id.
29. FRANZ ALEXANDER ET AL., PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATION 133 (Bison Book 1980) (1946).
30. Stolzenberg, supra note 1.
31. KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: MANIC-DEPRESSIVE ILLNESS AND
THE ARTISTIC TEMPERAMENT (1995).
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feeling of oneness with the other and the world, a dizzying freedom from
the stultifying effects of ordinary life. But falling in love also brings the
possibility that one's hold on reality will weaken as idealization,
obsessional thinking and irrational jealousy take over. Here the worry is
not so much a mind vulnerable to domination, to annihilation by
aggressive forces, but instead a fragile ego, one vulnerable to disorder
and fragmentation, to what analysts call regression.32 Loss of sanity
rather than aggression is the primary threat to the ego here.
I am suggesting that we move too quickly to the view that
rationalism is always an assault on the romantic soul, that it is a
symptom of anxiety about our own madly passionate natures, or that it is
a flight from love. Instead, rationalism may have its adaptive side, one
that seeks to reinforce the ego structures needed to experience the
passionate intensity of human emotions. It is possible to see rationalism
not as an escape from romanticism, not as a defensive maneuver to
protect the self from the excesses of desire, but instead as an effort to
master, to fully experience, our passionate natures.
We can see clearly the individual's vulnerability to psychological
fragmentation in two contexts. First is the psychoanalytic setting.
Psychoanalysis cannot be utilized well in situations where individuals
suffer from problems related to weak ego structures because the
regressive pull of the analytic situation will overwhelm them. These
patients will sometimes be unable to mobilize reasoned thinking to
control and contain the transference feelings and fantasies. They will no
longer think that the analyst is emotionally distant like their father; they
will believe that the analyst actually is their father. This does not mean
that psychoanalysis cannot be beneficial in these circumstances, but only
that psychoanalysis may be doing something different for patients in
need of ego fortification.
The threat of ego fragmentation is also on display in childrearing.
Although we raise children in an atmosphere of unconditional love, this
does not mean an atmosphere of free love. Indeed, a total lack of
discipline, stability, and structure would have disastrous psychological
consequences for a young child. Children need to internalize the
elements of a stable and organized world in order to build up basic
psychological structures that can order and integrate the irrational parts
of human experience. Paradoxically, children require discipline in order
32. See, e.g., Sydney E. Pulver, The Psychoanalytical Process and Mechanisms of
Therapeutic Change, in PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS 81, 87 (Burness E. Moore
& Bernard D. Fine eds., 1995).
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that they may become adults capable of romantic flights of passion.
Language acquisition is a paradigmatic example of the role of
rationalism in making the romantic life possible. The rational rules of
grammar produce scientific thinking, but also poetry.
Rationalism will not make us poets or lovers, but it may provide
some of the psychological tools we need to harness the creative and
transformative energies of the romantic psyche. Nomi Stolzenberg's
marvelous essay moves us to think about liberalism in love as a deeply
ambivalent state, one defined not by the opposition between reason and
passion, but by their mutual interdependence.

